INTRODUCTION
In this document we describe the 256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher. This is the extended version of the Rijndael Block Cipher, proposed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daeman, which has been chosen to be the AES by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The input, the output and the cipher key for the Extended-Rijndael are 256, 384 or 512 bits in length.
NOTATION AND CONVENTIONS

Extended-Rijndael
Inputs and Outputs
The input, the output and the cipher key for Extended-Rijndael are each bit sequences containing 256, 384 or 512 bits with the constraint that the input and output sequences have the same length.
Bytes
The basic unit for processing in this algorithm is a byte, a sequence of eight bits treated as a single entity. Each bytes b is interpreted as a finite field element which can be represented in binary notation 7 (Ih7h6hsh4h3h2hJhoD or hexadecimal notation (lh/10D or polynomial nocation Ib;x; . 
= L(a; tBbJx i ).
;=0
Multiplication is achieved in two steps. In the first step, the polynomial product c(x) = a(x) • hex) is algebraically expanded, and like powers are collected to give: 14 ; c(x) = Lcix i , where <, = EB(aj ebi_J. (2) ;=0 j=O
(1)
The second step of the multiplication is to reduce c(x) modulo a polynomial of degree 8; the result can be reduced to a polynomial of degree less than 8. This is accomplished with the polynomial x 8 + 1, so that:
x' modtx'' + 1) = x;mod8.
(3)
The modular product of a (x) 
Because x 8 + I is not an irreducible polynomial over GF (2 8 ),
multiplication by a fixed eight-term polynomial is not necessarily invertible. However, the Extended-Rijndael algorithm specifies a fixed eight-term polynomial that does have an inverse:
a(x) = 1031x 7 
+ 1051x
6 + {031x'+ 1021x 4 + 1021x'+ 1041r+ 1021x+ 1021,
a-1(x) = 1031x 7 + 1041x 6 + 1031r+ 1031x 4 + {02Ix'+ {051r+ 1021x+ 1031.
THE CIPHER
The length (Nb) of the cipher input, the cipher output, the cipher state the cipher key (Nk), measured in multiples of 64 bits (Nb), is 4, 6 or 8. The number of rounds (Nr) depends on the block length and the key length: Nr = max lNh, Nkl+6.
The cipher is described in the following pseudo code, for which the individual transformations and the key schedule are described in the following sections (the array w contains the key schedule, an array of round keys).
Cipher 
The SubBytes Transformation
The SubBytes transformation is a non-linear byte substitution that operates independently on each byte of the State using a substitution table (S-box) as in the original Rijndael algorithm ( [2, 10, 15] ). This S-box, which is invertible, is constructed by composing two transformations:
I. Take the multiplicative inverse in the finite field GF (2 8 ) ; the element {OOI is mapped to itself.
2. Apply an affine (over GF(2)) transformation defined by: 
The ShiftRows Transformation
The ShiftRows transformation operates individually on each row of the state by cyclically shifting the bytes in the row such that:
Sr,c = sr,(c+shijt(r.Nb))modNb (8) for 0 < r < 8 and 0~C < Nb, where the shift value shifttr.Nb) = r mod Nb This has the effect of moving bytes to "lower" positions in the row (i.e., lower values of C in a given row), while the "lowest" bytes wrap around into the "top" of the row (i.e., higher values of C in a given row). 
The MixColumns Transformation
The MixColumns transformation operates on the State column-by-column, treating each column as a eight-term polynomial as described in Sec. 3. The columns are considered as polynomials over GF (2 8 ) and multiplied rnodulo z" + 1 with a fixed polynomial a(x), given by:
The pseudo code for this transformation is as follows, where the function FFmul(x, y) returns the product of two finite field elements x and y. 
where [w,] are the key schedule words described in Sec. 4.5, and round is a value in the range 0::::; round S: Nr.
In the Cipher, the initial Round Key addition occurs when round = 0, prior to the first application of the round function. The application of the AddRoundKey transformation to the Nr rounds of the Cipher occurs when 1 ::::; round ts Nr. This transformation is its own inverse, since it only involves an application of the XOR operation.
Key Expansion
The 
end while end
Note that this key schedule, which is illustrated in Figure I for Nk = 4 and Nb = 6, can be generated 'onthe fly' if necessary using a buffer of max(Nh, Nk) words.
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c== Figure 1 . The key schedule and round key selection for Nk = 4 and Nb = 6
S. INVERSE CIPHER
The inversion of the cipher code presented in Sec. 4 is straightforward and provides the following pseudo code for the inverse cipher. 
The InvShiftRows Transformation
The InvShiftRows transformation operates individually on each row of the state cyclically shifting the bytes in the row such that: (11 ) for 0 < r < 8 and 0:::; c < Nb where the cyclic shift values shift(r, Nb) are mentioned in Sec. 4 
The InvSubBytes Transformation
InvSubBytes is the inverse of the byte substitution transformation, in which the inverse S-box is applied to each byte of the State. This is obtained by applying the inverse of the affine transformation (4.1) followed by taking the multiplicative inverse in GF (2 8 ).
The inverse of the affine tranformation (4.1) being: 
The InvMixColumns Transformation
The InvMixColumns transformation acts independently on every column of the state and treats each column as a eight-term polynomial as described in Sec. 3. The columns are considered as polynomials over GF (2 8 ) and multiplied modulo r" + I with a fixed polynomial a·l(x), given by:
Equivalent Inverse Cipher
In the straightforward Inverse Cipher presented above, the sequence of the transformations differs from that of the Cipher, while the form of the key schedules for encryption and decryption remains the same. However the order of InvSubBytes and InvShiftRows can be reversed. The order of AddRoundKey and InvMixColumns can also be reversed, provided that the columns (words) of the decryption key schedule are transformed using InvMixColumns. This latter operation shall not be performed on the first or the last Nb words in the key schedule, since those do not operate with InvlvlbcColumns. Given these changes, the resulting Equivalent Inverse Cipher offers a more efficient structure than the straightforward Inverse Cipher described above. In the pseudo code for the Equivalent Inverse Cipher, the word array dw[] contains the modified decryption key schedule. The motivations for designing the S-box, the ShiftRows offsets, the Key Schedule, and the number of rounds of the Extended Rijndael are based on the original Rijndael Cipher ([1, 2, 9]). The most important changes have been made in designing the MixColumns transformation.
The MixColumns transformation:
MixColumns has been chosen from the space of 8-byte to 8-byte linear transformations using the following criteria:
1. Invertibility; 2. Linearity in GF (2) 
Branch number:
Let F be a linear transformation acting on byte vectors and let the byte weight of a vector be the number of nonzero bytes. The byte weight of a vector is denoted by W(a). The Branch Number of a linear transformation is a measure of its diffusion power Definition. The branch number of a linear transformation F is:
A non-zero byte is called an active byte. The coefficients of the MixColumns have been chosen in such a way that its branch number, denoted by B, is 8. A linear relation between input and output bits involves bits from at least 8 different bytes from input and output.
STRENGTH AGAINST KNOWN ATTACKS
Symmetry Properties and Weak Keys of the DES Type
Symmetry in the behavior of the cipher has been eliminated by using the round constants that are different for each round. The fact that the cipher and its inverse use different components practically eliminates the possibility for weak and semi-weak keys, as existing for DES. The non-linearity of the key expansion practically eliminates the possibility of equivalent keys.
Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis (DC)
DC attacks [8] are possible if there are predictable difference propagations over all but a few (typically 2 or 3) rounds that have a prop ratio (the relative amount of all input pairs that for the given input difference give rise to the output difference) significantly larger than 2 1 -" if n is the block length. For all block lengths of this extended version, this is sufficient. The proof is given in Sec. 7.2.3.
Linear cryptanalysis (LC)
LC attacks [13] are possible if there are predictable input-output correlations over all but a few (typically 2 or 3) rounds significantly larger than 2-012 • For this extended version, we prove that there are no 4-round linear trails with a correlation above 2-24 (Nb+l) (and no S-round trails with a correlation above 2-48 (Nb+I)). For all block lengths of Extended-Rijndael, this is sufficient. The proof is given in Sec. 7.2.4.
Weight of differential and linear trails.
In [9] , it is shown that:
• The prop ratio of a differential trail can be approximated by the product of the prop ratios of its active S-boxes.
• The correlation of a linear trail can be approximated by the product of input-output correlations of its active S-boxes. The wide trail strategy can be summarised as follows:
• Choose an S-box where the maximum prop ratio and the maximum input-output correlation are as small as possible. For the 256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher, this is respectively 2-6and 2-
•
• Construct the diffusion layer in such a way that there are no multiple-round trails with few active S-boxes.
We prove that the minimum number of active S-boxes in any 4-round differential or linear trail is 8(Nb+ 1). This gives a maximum prop ratio of 2 48 (Nb+I)
for any 4-round differential trail and a maximum of 2-2 4(Nb+I) for the correlation for any 4-round linear trail. This is independent of the value of the Round Keys.
Propagation of patterns
For DC, the active S-boxes in a round are determined by the nonzero bytes in the difference of the states at the input of a round. Let the pattern that specifies the positions of the active S-boxes be denoted by the term (difference) activity pattern and let the (difference) byte weight be the number of active bytes in a pattern.
For LC, the active S-boxes in .
• round are determined by the nonzero bytes in the selection vectors [9] at the input of a round. Let the pattern that specifies the positions of the active S-boxes be denoted by the term (correlation) activity pattern and let the (correlation) byte weight W(a) be the number of active bytes in a pattern a.
Moreover, let a column of an activity pattern with at least one active byte be denoted by active column. Let the column weight, denoted by Wc(a), be the number of active columns in a pattern. The byte weight of a columnj of a, denoted by W(a)l j , is the number of active bytes in it.
The weight of a trail is the sum of the weights of its activity patterns at the input of each round. Difference and correlation activity patterns can be seen as propagating through the transformations of the different rounds of the block cipher to form linear and differential trails. This is illustrated with an example in Figure 2 . Proof The fact that MixColumns has a Branch Number equal to 8 implies that sum of the byte weights of each column in bo and a, is lower bounded by 8. If the column weight of a, is Q, this gives a lower bounded of 8Q for the sum of the byte weights of bo and a, . As a o and b o have the same byte weight, the lower bounded is also valid for the sum of the weights a o and a" proving the theorem.
QED
Theorem 1 is illustrated in Figure 3 . Proof By applying Theorem 1 on the first two rounds (l and 2) and on the last two rounds (3 and 4), it follows that the byte weight of the trail is lower bounded by the sum of the column weight of a, and a 3 multiplied by 8. By applying Lemma 1, the sum of the column weight of a, and a 3 is lower bounded by Nb+1. From this it follows that the byte weight of the four-round trail is lower bounded by 8(Nh+ 1). QED Theorem 2 is illustrated in Figure 5 .
Truncated Differentials
The concept of truncated differentials was first published by Lars Knudsen [12] . The corresponding class of attacks exploit the fact that in some ciphers differential trails tend to cluster [9] . Clustering takes place if for certain sets of input difference patterns and output difference patterns, the number of differential trails is exceedingly large. The expected probability within that a differential trail stays the boundaries of the cluster can be computed independently of the prop ratios of the individual differential trails. Ciphers in which all transformation operate on the state in well aligned blocks are prone to be susceptible to this type of attack. Since this is the case for 256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher, all transformations operating on bytes rather than individual bits, we investigated its resistance against "truncated differentials". For 6 rounds or more, no attacks faster than exhaustive key search have been found. In this attack [14] , the attacker constructs polynomials using cipher input/output pairs. This attack is feasible if the components in the cipher have a compact algebraic expression and can be combined to give expressions with manageable complexity. The basis of the attack is that if the constructed polynomials (or rational expressions) have a small degree, only few cipher input/output pairs are necessary to solve for the (keydependent) coefficients of the polynomial. The complicated expression of the S-box in GF (2 8 ) , in combination with the effect of the diffusion layer prohibits these types of attack for more than a few rounds. The expression for the S-box is given by:
S(x)={ 63}+{ 8f}x'27+{b5}x'91+{Ol}r23+{f4}r39+{25}r47+{f9}r51+{ 09}r 53 +{05}r 54 J 7.5. Weak keys as in IDEA The weak keys discussed in this subsection are keys that result in a block cipher mapping with detectable weaknesses. The best known case of weak keys are those of IDEA [9] . Typically, this weakness occurs for ciphers in which the non-linear operations depends on the actual key value. This is not the case for 256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher, where keys are applied using the XOR and all nonlinearity is in the fixed S-box. In 256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher, there is no restriction on key selection.
Related-Key Attacks
In related-key attacks [II], the cryptanalyst can do cipher operations using different (unknown or partly unknown) keys with a chosen relation. The key schedule of 256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher, with its high diffusion and non-linearity, makes it very improbable that this type of attack can be successful for 256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher.
EXPERIMENTS AND PERFORMANCE
The cipher and its inverse take the same time Table 1 and Table 2 Table 2 . Performance figures for the cipher From these tables, it can be seen that it is approximately four times slower to process each block when the length of the block and the cipher key are doubled. Although nearly half of the total speed of the cipher will be reduced, the space for exhaustive key search will be significantly enlarged.
CONCLUSION
256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher is expected, for all key and block lengths defined, to behave as good as can be expected from a block cipher with the given block and key lengths. This implies among other things, the following. The most efficient key-recovery attack for 256/384/512-bit extended Rijndael-like Block Cipher is exhaustive key search. Obtaining information from given plaintext-ciphertext pairs about other plaintext-ciphertext pairs cannot be done more efficiently than by determining the key by exhaustive key search. The expected effort of exhaustive key search depends on the length of the Cipher Key and is:
